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Abstract
Background: The health sector reform in Colombia, initiated by Law 100 (1993) that introduced a managed
competition model, is generally presented as a successful experience of improving access to care through a health
insurance regulated market. The study’s objective is to improve our understanding of the factors influencing access
to the continuum of care in the Colombian managed competition model, from the social actors’ point of view.
Methods: An exploratory, descriptive-interpretative qualitative study was carried out, based on case studies of four
healthcare networks in rural and urban areas. Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted to a three
stage theoretical sample: I) cases, II) providers and III) informants: insured and uninsured users (35), health
professionals (51), administrative personnel (20), and providers’ (18) and insurers’ (10) managers. Narrative content
analysis was conducted; segmented by cases, informant’s groups and themes.
Results: Access, particularly to secondary care, is perceived as complex due to four groups of obstacles with
synergetic effects: segmented insurance design with insufficient services covered; insurers’ managed care and
purchasing mechanisms; providers’ networks structural and organizational limitations; and, poor living conditions.
Insurers’ and providers’ values based on economic profit permeate all factors. Variations became apparent between
the two geographical areas and insurance schemes. In the urban areas barriers related to market functioning
predominate, whereas in the rural areas structural deficiencies in health services are linked to insufficient public
funding. While financial obstacles are dominant in the subsidized regime, in the contributory scheme supply
shortage prevails, related to insufficient private investment.
Conclusions: The results show how in the Colombian healthcare system structural and organizational barriers to
care access, that are common in developing countries, are widened by both the insurers’ use of mechanisms that
limit the utilization and the public healthcare providers’ change of behavior in a competition environment. They
provide evidence to question the promotion of the managed competition model in low and middle-income
countries.
Background
The managed competition model is one of the reforms
promoted in the last few decades in Latin America, in
response to the objective to improve equity and efficiency
of health systems. It has been characterized by the intro-
duction of a regulated market for health insurance to
correct market failures [1]. Under managed competition,
insurance companies are responsible for providing or
arranging the provision of health services for their
enrolled members, through their own providers or
through contracted ones. The Colombian experience is
considered to be one of the first examples of implement-
ing managed competition in a low-income country [2].
The managed competition model in Colombia
Colombia radically reformed its healthcare system with
Law 100 of 1993 [3], which created the General Social
Security System in Health, with two insurance schemes:
the Contributory Regime for formal sector employees
and people able to pay, financed by mandatory contribu-
tions [3]; and the Subsidized Regime for people without
the ability to pay, funded by resources from the Contrib-
utory Scheme and other sources of financing, such as
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toras de Salud - EPS) were introduced for managing the
Contributory Regime, as well as Subsidized Regimen
( E m p r e s a sP r o m o t o r a sd eS a l u dS u b s i d i a d a s-E P S ’S).
They were to compete for the enrolment of population
and received a capitation payment to cover different ben-
efit packages in each regime (Plan Obligatorio de Salud -
POS and Plan Obligatorio de Salud Subsidiado - POS-S)
[4]. Currently, the contributory market is characterized
by the predominance of private insurers - 86.1% of the
affiliation - and the concentration in 5 private insurers
that hold 50% of markets share [5]. The largest public
insurer has been transformed into a mixed company with
private capital and 5.8% of membership [5]. Competition
for contracts with the insurers was also introduced
among public and private healthcare providers (Institu-
ciones Prestadoras de Salud - IPS). Healthcare for the
uninsured (vinculados) and services excluded from the
POS-S are provided by public hospitals funded by local
and regional authorities [6], that represent 31.3% of total
healthcare providers [7]. The uninsured have to pay for
services and the insured make a co-payment according to
their income [8].
The reform of the Colombian healthcare system has
been, and still is, presented as a successful experiment
in improving access to care [9,10]. However, it has
been a long, complicated process, and the results are
controversial [11,12]. In spite of the significant increase
in public health expenditure from 3% to 6.6% of GDP,
over the 1993 to 2007 period [13], around 15.3% to
19.3% of the population remains uninsured [14,15];
and 38.7% are insured under the subsidized regime
[15] that covers a range of services (POS-S) greatly
inferior to that provided by the contributory one
[16,17]. Approximately 17% of health expenditure is
devoted to administrative costs [18], of which more
than 50% is spent on supporting daily operations
(financial, personnel, and information management)
and enrollment processes [19].
Furthermore, several studies seem to indicate a
decrease in realized access to services [20,21], and point
to significant barriers related to characteristics of popu-
lation, such as insurance enrolment [22-28], income
[22,25,26,28], education [22-27,29] and, characteristics
of services, such as geographic accessibility and quality
of care [26,30]. In 2005, the maternal mortality rate, an
indicator that is sensitive to the overall healthcare sys-
tem, was 130/100.000 in Colombia, compared to 30/
100.000 in Costa Rica, while per capita 2004 health
expenditure were similar (USD 549 and USD 598,
respectively) but a GNP per capita lower in the former
(USD 6130 and USD 9220) [31].
Figure 1 The model of managed competition in the Colombian healthcare system. Figure legend text: FOSYGA: Fondo de Solidaridad y
Garantía (Solidarity and Guarantee Fund); EPS: Empresa Promotora de Salud (Insurance Company for the Contributory Regime); EPS’S: (Insurance
Company for the Subsidized Regime); IPS: Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios de Salud (Healthcare Provider); ESE: Empresa Social del Estado
(Public Health Provider). ® Monetary flows. Source: authors.
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condition sine qua non for the successful implementa-
tion of managed competition, according to its suppor-
ters [1]: the existence of an effective regulatory system.
These studies [32-35] reveal deficiencies in regulation
authorities in their ability to control a great number of
institutions related to insufficient financial resources,
lack of control mechanisms and excessive, and some-
times contradictory, regulation norms.
Most studies of the determinants of use of care in
Colombia concentrate on personal variables and initial
contact with services, and ignore contextual variables -
health policy and characteristics of healthcare services.
Insurance coverage, measured only by enrolment rate, is
often viewed as an independent variable, although in
managed competition models, insurers directly influence
the provider networks and conditions of access to
healthcare [36]. In addition, little research has evaluated
access from the point of view of the social actors
[26,37-39], despite the limited capacity of quantitative
models in explaining determinants of use of care, due to
methodological difficulties in including contextual vari-
ables [40,41].
The objective of this article is to contribute to the
improvement of our understanding of the factors influ-
encing access to the continuum of healthcare services in
the Colombian managed competition model, from the
perspective of social actors.
Methods
There were two Areas of Study: one urban (Ciudad
Bolívar, Bogotá, D.C.) and one rural (La Cumbre,
Department of Valle del Cauca) with 628.672 [42] and
11.122 inhabitants [43] respectively. In the former, a
wide array of insurers are present, while in the latter
only one subsidized insurance company, with the major-
ity of the contributory insurance enrollees being
affiliated in two insurance companies. In both areas
most of the population live in poverty [42]. In the urban
area, the coverage of the subsidized regime is slightly
less than in the rural area (30% compared to 37.5%),
whereas the percentage of contributory regime enrollees
is markedly higher (43.7% compared to 9.7%) [42,44].
The rest remain uninsured (26.3% and 47.2%
respectively).
The Study Design was qualitative, exploratory, and
descriptive-interpretative, based on a case study of four
healthcare service networks. The case study provides
extensive information about the phenomenon - access
to care in the managed competition model in Colombia
- based on individual cases [45,46]. The analysis of
access to care is based on the theoretical frameworks of
Aday and Andersen [47], and Gold [36]. The first distin-
guishes factors that influence access to care related to
health policies, the characteristics of healthcare services
- resources and organization - and the population.
Under organizational determinants of access, Aday &
Andersen’s framework refers, among others, to the man-
ner in which medical personnel and facilities are coordi-
nated and controlled in the process of providing health
services [47]. Gold’s theoretical model adapts the former
to incorporate factors related to insurance companies, to
better understand how organizational structures devel-
oped by managed care models affect access. This frame-
work acknowledges the influence of managed care
organizations on the way individuals are covered by
their health plans by defining the provider network and
the way in which patients access it [36].
In this study, access to care is considered to be the
use of services along the continuum of care [48].
A theoretical Sample was selected in three stages. I)
Case studies: healthcare networks of both insurance
regimes, in both the rural and urban areas. The network
is defined as the insurer and their healthcare providers,
either contracted and/or owned; II) Public and private
providers from different levels of care, and with different
ownership relationship to the insurance company; III)
Informants, searching for variation in discourse: a)
insured and uninsured users, over the age of 18, who
would have used or tried to use at least two levels of
care in the past six months; b) health and administrative
professionals with at least one year of experience; and c)
managers of the providers and insurers. Users were
selected through the first level of care records and,
when not available, with help of the health professionals
who provided their care. For the others, an institutional
contact identified possible informants according to the
criteria above. Informants were then contacted and
invited to participate. The final sample size, between 24
and 61 informants per case study, was reached by
saturation of the information (Table 1). The differences
are due to uninsured people being incorporated as infor-
mants into the subsidized networks, and because rural
EPS-S managers and administrative professionals refused
to participate.
Data collection
Individual semi-structured interviews with a topic guide
were conducted. The guides - with a common section
and a specific section for each informant group -
included opinions on access to the continuum of ser-
vices across the network, elements that influence it, and
strategies for improvement. In the user guide, users’
experience with services was also explored. Interviews
with users were conducted at their homes, the remain-
der of informants mostly in the workplace. The inter-
views lasted between one and two hours and were
audio-recorded and fully transcribed.
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A content analysis [49] was conducted with the support
of the software Atlas-ti 5.0. The process of generating
categories was mainly inductive. Data were segmented
by case study, informant’s group, and themes. Themes
were identified, coded, re-coded and classified identify-
ing common patterns by looking at regularities, conver-
gences and divergences in data, through a process of
constant comparisons, going back and forth between
data and conceptual framework. In order to ensure the
quality of results, the information was triangulated
between groups of informants and the results were con-
trasted with the informants and the bibliography. In
addition, four researchers with different backgrounds
and in-depth knowledge of the context participated in
the analysis.
Ethical considerations
Participants were informed of the objective of the study
and that they were free to participate and to leave at
any point. Participants gave oral consent for their parti-
cipation and the interviews to be recorded. The record-
ings and transcripts were codified in such a way that the
individual origin of each one could not be identified,
before being appropriately stored. These results are part
of a broader research aimed at analyzing the impact of
integrated healthcare networks on health care access
and efficiency, in Colombia and Brazil. Ethical approval
was sought and obtained from the University of Rosar-
io’s Ethical Committee in 2005.
Results
The general perception is that access to healthcare along
the continuum of care is, in general, complex and does
not suit population needs. Difficulties especially arise in
access to specialized care, although serious problems
were also identified in access to the first level of care in
the contributory regime in the urban area. Four groups
of interrelated obstacles emerged: the insurance design,
insurers’ managed care and purchasing mechanisms, the
characteristics of the network of healthcare providers
and, to a lesser extent, the socio-economic characteris-
tics of the population. Competition in insurance man-
agement and in the provision of care emerges as a
barrier that influences all others. In the informant’s dis-
courses, important differences emerged in the intensity
of barriers depending on the area and insurance scheme
(Table 2).
Barriers related to the insurance design
The informants of the subsidized regime, in both areas,
reported difficulties of access to healthcare related to
the insurance design: exclusion from benefits of neces-
sary specialized services, classification of services by
levels of care and co-payment (Table 3). The informants,
especially secondary care specialists, considered that
blocked access to tests classified as lower level in the
more complex healthcare levels, as well as the inclusion
of only very basic diagnostic tests in the first level, force
patients to go back and forth between several health
facilities and delay the resolution of the health problem.
Finally, out-of-the-pocket payments - or co-payment
for the insured - emerge as one of the biggest barriers.
Enrollees of the subsidized regime point to co-payment
of services not covered - specialized diagnostic tests and
medicines for chronic and high-cost diseases - while the
uninsured also mention out-of-the-pocket payment for
basic specialized services as a barrier. When confronted
Table 1 Final composition of the informants’ sample
Category of key actors Urban area Rural area
Subsidized
network
Contributory
network
Subsidized
network
Contributory
network
Healthcare users Insured 12 6 9 8
Uninsured 6 0
(*) 60
(*)
Healthcare
professionals
Firs level of care 10 4 7 7
Secondary and tertiary level of
care
11 4 4 4
Administrative
personnel
Providers 4 1 4 3
Insurers 6 2 0
(**) 0
(***)
Managers Providers 6 4 4 4
Insurers 6 3 0
(**) 1
Total 61 24 34 27
(*) The network only provides care to insured healthcare users
(**) The Subsidized Regime Insurer (EPS’S), the only one in the area, refused to participate in the study
(***) The contacts of this category refused to participate due to problems with their agendas
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Page 4 of 12Table 2 Difficulties in access to healthcare by type of barrier, insurance regime and area
Subsidized Regime Contributory Regime
Urban area Rural area Urban area Rural area
Insurance design POS-S low coverage of specialized
care
POS-S low coverage of specialized
care
Norms limiting access to
medical care
Norms limiting
access to medical
care
Classification of services by level
of care
Classification of services by level of
care
Co-payments for non-POS-S
services
Co-payments for non-POS-S services
(chronic and high-cost illnesses)
Out-of-pocket (basic specialized
care)
Out-of-pocket (basic specialized care)
Insurance
companies
Maximization of benefits
Managed care mechanisms Managed care mechanisms Managed care mechanisms Managed care
mechanisms
- authorizations - authorization requirements - limits to clinical practice - limits to clinical
practice
- capitation payment - authorization
requirements
Conflict in the interpretation of
services included in the POS-S
Purchase of services
- fragmented contracting
- change in contracted providers
Network of
healthcare
providers
Public healthcare providers’ search
for economic profit
Public healthcare providers’ search for
economic profit
Shortage of basic and high
technology specialized care
Shortage of basic and high
technology specialized care
Shortage of basic
specialized care and primary
care
Distance to primary and specialized
care
Distance to primary and
specialized care
Distance to
specialized care
Waiting time for specialized care Waiting time for specialized care Waiting time for specialized
care
Waiting time for
specialized care
In-person and restricted
appointment requirements
In-person and restricted appointment
requirements
Poor quality of care Poor quality of care
Population
characteristics
Low income level Low income level Low income level Low income level
Lack of family support Lack of family support Lack of family
support
POS-S: Subsidized Regimen Benefit Package.
Source: authors.
Table 3 Examples of quotations regarding “barriers related to the insurance design”
Category Quotations
Low coverage of specialized care of the
subsidized benefits package
“the subsidized regime is very limited, so it has a benefit plan that covers certain diseases and
procedures. There is a great number of diseases, drugs and exams that are not covered (...)” (manager,
public specialized care provider - subsidized rural network)
Classification of services by level of care “the fragmentation has been very serious, and very harmful, (...) here they fragmented the diseases (...). I
mean, a patient can’t get pneumonia and fungus on his feet because we treat pneumonia here, but
fungus is treated in another place, so no, we can’t treat any diseases here that aren’t level III of care”
(health professional, public secondary care provider - urban subsidized network)
Conditions that restrict access to services “you have 70 weeks of coverage and they have to pay 30% of 100 million pesos [33.334€], where are
they going to get it?“ (administrative professional, private secondary care provider - rural contributory
network)
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in seeking medical care, “... they ordered me those for the
thyroid, and there were some exams I need to do that
cost about three million [EUR 1.000] (...) the doctor said,
‘Well, sell your house or whatever you have’, and I said,
‘What house? I got the TSH because that is covered, but
not the others, because they’re too expensive” (user, sub-
sidized regime - rural area). In the discourse of the con-
tributory regime’s informants, there strongly emerge
norms limiting access to medical care - minimum con-
tributory’s period for high cost services or suspension of
insurance coverage for lack of payment. As a conse-
quence, they cannot access health services or end up
having to make a co-payment (Table 3).
Barriers related to insurers
The presence of the insurance companies in the health-
care system emerges, in the interviews with managers
and professionals of public facilities, as a barrier to
access for those who are insured under the subsidized
regime (Table 4). On the one hand, insurers try to maxi-
mize their benefits by introducing mechanisms to
reduce the use of services. On the other, its presence
requires re-routing funds from medical care to interme-
diation: “all these intermediaries we have earn money
based on how much they can avoid directing it to hospi-
tals, so they end up keeping the biggest piece of the pie”
(health professional, public primary care provider -
urban subsidized network).
The informants from both insurance regimes identify
the managed care mechanisms employed by insurers as
a barrier to use of services (Table 4). The mechanisms
they identified differ according to the healthcare net-
work type. In networks where there is a separation
between the insurers and the healthcare providers,
mechanisms directly acting upon demand (such a as
authorization of clinical services) emerge, whereas if the
insurer shares the ownership with the healthcare provi-
ders, prevailing mechanisms act upon supply -control of
the clinical practice and capitation payment. According
to the interviewees, difficulties vary according to the
mechanism, and they often refer to access to specialized
care. On one side, authorizations delay care, especially
in emergency transport and diagnostic testing: “They
Table 4 Examples of quotations regarding “barriers related to insurers”
Category Quotations
Introduction of intermediaries that maximize benefits “Intermediation is harming the provision of services. Health enters the market and that’s
when all the costs and quality problems start, which modify all of the activities. So the
financial event becomes more important than the health one“ (Manager, public secondary
care provider - urban subsidized network)
Use of managed care mechanisms for cost reduction “the auditors and those responsible for authorizations in the insurance companies, ... their job
shouldn’t be to try to stop authorizations, as they do now, basically because of costs” (health
professional, private secondary care provider-rural subsidized network)
Authorization “(...) they should give us the order, and that’s all. You see, they send [me] over to the
insurance company, and they’d say no, that I had to bring the others [doctor’s orders]. I had
to go to where he was hospitalized (...) They have you running all around (...) And run. And
it [the money] disappears in a flash, you hear, in bus tickets and everything else. So we don’t
have all that money to run around...bus tickets and the rest” (user, subsidized regime - rural
area)
Capitation payment “(...) the first level is capitated, and that is a very perverse contract mechanism. In a poor
system, in a poor country, because you have to sacrifice quality. So health professionals are
pressured to do the minimum, the minimum, because the cost is fixed, and if they go
beyond the minimum, then the contract is no longer worth it, it’s not profitable anymore. So
quality is often sacrificed in this contract system“ (health professional, private secondary
care provider - urban subsidized network)
Conflict in interpretation of health services included in
the subsidized benefits package (POS-S)
“the insurance company and the municipal health secretariat start throwing the ball back
and forth in an incredible way. Both start to create strategies so that the other will have to
provide care for the patient...(...) So the poor patient ends up being thrown from one side to
the other until finally he dies or he gets added complications” (manager, private secondary
care provider - urban subsidized network)
Fragmented contracting “the ARS [previous name for subsidized regime insurance company] owns the patient... So
it contracts this hospital for this, the other (hospital) for that... so I do a piece here, another
there, another there (...)” (health professional, public secondary care provider - urban
subsidized network)
Better access to the continuum of care for the uninsured “(...) I pick up the list and if I need a specific specialty, I look for where it is for “vinculados”
[the uninsured], where the waiting time is shorter and I send him there (...) That part lets
one play with the windows of waiting list. In the Subsidized regime, you don’t have this
waiting time, because you’re limited to what the insurers have contracted” (manager,
primary care provider - urban subsidized network)
POS-S: Subsidized benefit package
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gency transport], it can last from one minute to four
hours just to get an answer. When they answer (...) it
could last...from immediately, to six hours, to three days,
according to the type of service requested” (administra-
tive, public primary care provider - urban subsidized
network). The users from the rural area add costs in
time and transportation, to do the paperwork and to
obtain authorizations. The limits to clinical practice
(medicines, tests and referrals to specialists) delay diag-
nosis and treatment. Capitation payment to healthcare
providers has a direct negative impact on access by
creating incentives to decrease the quantity and quality
of services provided, and increasing waiting time and
travel costs to capitated hospitals that become the first
choice of insurers.
Two difficulties are added to subsidized enrollees of
the urban area. First, the conflict between insurers and
the local health authority in interpreting which services
are included in the POS-S, as both want to avoid bear-
ing the costs of the service. This results in more paper-
work for patients and further delays in care (Table 4).
The second is the way of services purchasing: the insur-
ance companies split the process of care into various
sub-processes to be purchased from different hospitals,
requiring patients to go back and forth between various
centers in order to resolve their health problems (Table
4). In addition, contracted healthcare providers fre-
quently change, generating additional costs for patients
due to errors in referral and the need to adapt them to
the system (opening hours, documents, etc.).
The majority of public service professionals consider
that barriers created by intermediation have made access
to the continuum of healthcare services of subsidized
enrollees worse than that of the uninsured who use the
networks organized by the local health authority (Table 4).
Barriers related to the network of healthcare providers
The barriers that predominantly emerge are those
regarding the behavior of public healthcare providers in
the subsidized regime, and the availability and geo-
graphic accessibility of the networks organized by
insurers of both regimes. According to the informants,
competition has triggered significant change in public
hospitals, as they prioritize economic profit over
patients’ health needs (Table 5). It is considered a com-
mon practice for patients with profitable illnesses to be
selected, and for patients who are uninsured, or lack the
proper documentation to invoice the services, to be
denied treatment. This is an especially critical issue in
the urban area: “Some diseases are not profitable; you
see, for example, all of the chronic, internal medicine
ones, because of the length of hospital stay and the cost
of medicines. So people tend to provide care for easily
resolvable diseases with short hospital stays and appro-
priate fees (...) and this goes against the population pyra-
mid” (manager, secondary care provider - rural
subsidized network).
Table 5 Examples of quotations regarding “barriers related to the network of healthcare providers”
Category Quotations
Changes in behavior of the public
healthcare providers
“The difference is that ten years ago we simply gave the patient what he needed, without asking where are
you from, what [insurance] do you have or don’t have, we’d just treated them and the State paid. Now we
have to ask what he has, what’s wrong, and who will pay or who to charge.” (manager, public secondary
care provider - rural subsidized network).
Distance to specialized care services “Sometimes they just don’t go, because on the one hand there’s the bus ticket, which costs $6.000 [2.5€]
roundtrip (...) and if they don’t have it, they have to put up with the disease, because what can you do just
with herbs?” (user, subsidized regime-rural area)
“Many patents never get care because of that [geographic distance]. I have hypertensive patients who I’ve
referred to internists and they’ve never gone (...) It’s one zone in particular, and we’re very far away” (health
professional primary healthcare provider - urban contributory network)
Causes: deficit in service supply “Sometimes the high technology hospital does not have a contract with certain institutions [insurance
companies of the subsidized regime], and one finds oneself with the problem of having to send a patient
somewhere, but not knowing where, you see? So the patient ends up staying in the emergency room because
we can’t find a place to send him.” (manager, subsidized secondary care provider - rural subsidized network)
“Bogotá is a very, very big city, with a gigantic deficit of beds. I think we’re the only country in the world that
calmly closes its two biggest [public] hospitals due to financial problems (...) (...) they should intervene and
resolve the problem, but not close it (...)” (manager, public primary care provider - urban subsidized network)
Waiting time “The waiting time is not good. I mean, I think that patients that make appointments that are relatively high
priority are not getting them” (health professional, public secondary care provider - urban contributory
network
In-person and restricted appointment
requirements
“There are patients that sometimes get up at the crack of dawn, stand in line, aren’t able to get an
appointment, get tired of it, and a year passes, then two, and they don’t get their specific antigen, even though
they could be developing a serious illness“ (health professional, private secondary care provider - urban
subsidized network)
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specialties and high technology medical services emerge,
as well as limited geographic accessibility, both in the
rural area and in the contributory urban network, which
is aggravated by the low-income level of the population
(Table 5). In the latter, problems in accessibility go all
the way down to the first level of care. The causes of
the shortage vary according to the regime: in the con-
tributory regime, it is related to insufficient private
investment and the closing of public hospitals. In the
subsidized regime, informants point to insufficient pub-
lic funding and to elements of managed competition:
added administrative costs and incentives to close non-
profitable services (internal medicine) or to insurers not
contracting high technology services (Table 5).
Long waiting lists for specialized services, especially in
emergency care, are the greatest organizational difficulty
in both regimes and areas (Table 5). The informants
relate it to insufficient supply and to the authorization
requirements of insurance companies. In the subsidized
regime, in-person and restricted appointment require-
ments, and the poor quality of care, are additional bar-
riers to the access of specialized care (Table 5).
Discussion
Barriers in access to care and their interaction
Although the main objective of introducing managed
competition in Colombia was to improve access to care
[3], the results show several barriers of access to the
continuum of care. These obstacles are not only due to
factors usually taken into account in conceptual frame-
works for access - services and population characteris-
tics [47,50-52] - but also, and more importantly, to
characteristics of the insurance design and to the pre-
sence of insurance companies. All are permeated with
the values that introduced the managed competition
model, that is the search for economic benefit or sus-
tainability, which guides insurers and also healthcare
providers’ behavior. These values emerge in the
discourse of the informants as a direct barrier to access
or as a cause of other barriers (Figure 2).
These obstacles produce synergetic effects and
increase the negative impact on the use of care, an
aspect which is often omitted in quantitative research
due to its difficult measurement [53]. For example, the
insurers’ authorization or in-person appointment
requirements increase travel and time costs for patients,
which are already high in networks whose services are
hard to access geographically. Limits to first level of
care tests and authorization requirements increase wait-
ing times for specialized care, that are already long due
to insufficient availability of services.
Many difficulties in access emerge in both insurance
regimes and areas, but with remarkable differences. In
the subsidized regime, financial obstacles predominate
and are linked to a smaller specialized care services
portfolio. In the contributory regime, structural deficien-
cies in the network prevail among the obstacles.
In the rural area, structural difficulties emerge more
intensively due to insufficient public funds, a common
problem in low-income countries with integrated public
healthcare systems [54]. In the urban area there are
strong barriers related to market functioning - changes
of healthcare providers in the networks, conflict between
paying entities, fragmentation of service provision across
multiple providers, and the rejection of patients - coin-
ciding with other studies [55].
Causes of barriers to access
Segmented and insufficient insurance
The results show that subsidized insurance fails in facili-
tating access, not only due to the limited number of
included services, coinciding with other studies [16,17],
but because of the segmented design of the benefit
package. Services that are excluded - usually in the
initial phases of disease - are provided by networks
funded by local authorities [3], which promotes conflict
between health authorities and insurance companies to
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values
Insurance design
Characteristics 
of healthcare 
services
Characteristics 
of population at 
risk
Insurers
Access to 
continuum of 
care
Managed 
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Managed 
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Insurance design
Characteristics 
of healthcare 
services
Characteristics 
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Access to 
continuum of 
care
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Characteristics 
of healthcare 
services
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risk
Insurers
Access to 
continuum of 
care
Figure 2 Factors influencing access to the continuum of care based on categories emerging from the study. Figure legend text: Source:
authors.
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delays and sometimes in denial of care. In addition,
there is an interruption in the continuum of care, which
is aggravated by the classification of procedures by levels
of care, and the contracting of different interventions for
a healthcare process with different providers.
Due to insurance shortcomings, co-payments become
some of the most significant barriers to access. This
result, similar to other studies [56-59], contrasts with
the decrease in the proportion of out-of-pocket expenses
in total healthcare costs in Colombia, shown by official
statistics [13]. This decrease seems to be concentrated
mostly in those who are enrolled in the contributory
regime and who have a higher income level [60].
Competition in insurance and in provision of services
The implications of competition in insurance manage-
ment on access to healthcare services have been dis-
cussed on a theoretical level [61], and have generally
focused on insurers’ incentives to risk selection. In this
study, however, difficulties emerge regarding how
insurers influence the provision of care in aspects such
as services availability along the continuum of care and
its geographical or organizational accessibility; or the
implementation of mechanisms to limit the use of ser-
vices, such as authorization requirements or capitation
payment. In the networks analyzed, that integrate insur-
ance and provision of services, their influence is even
greater, through the direct control of medical practice.
The perceived notion that access along the continuum
of care is more fluid for the uninsured highlights the
significance of the barriers related to intermediation.
The control exerted by insurers over the way in which
patients receive healthcare has an extraordinary reper-
cussion on equity as it will make access to health care
vary among healthcare networks, and will increase the
inequities already present in the system design [62].
These results are similar to those obtained by another
study carried out in Colombia [39] and are also similar
to the U.S. context. In the latter, systematic literature
reviews show physician and enrollees’ opinion against
the use of managed care mechanisms, highlighting diffi-
culties of access to drugs, tests and treatments [63,64].
Some authors argue that managed care techniques
create dissatisfaction amongst physicians due to the loss
of control and autonomy of clinical decision making
[65]. However, the technique is not the problem in
itself, but the goals that are set and the context in
w h i c hi ti su s e d .G P so p e r a t i n ga sg a t e - k e e p e r s ,f o r
instance, can be used to improve access to the health
care system and relational continuity [66], but it can
become an obstacle when it is used to control references
to specialists, admissions and medical procedures, and
thereby control costs [67]. Mechanisms such as capita-
tion payment, that theoretically provide an incentive for
efficiency may reduce the provision of needed services
in environments such as developing countries with low
services productivity.
On the other hand, the results show that competition
in healthcare provision has meant a change in the values
of public healthcare providers who now tend to priori-
tize economic sustainability - already described in other
public health systems where the market was introduced
into service provision [68] which incentives selection
and, in some cases, rejection of patients.
These results also point towards the difficulty of intro-
ducing an effective regulatory system to correct market
failures, that has been documented in developed as well
as in a developing countries [69,70].
Therefore, the competition in insurance and provision
of services in Colombia contributes to an increase in the
negative impact of structural and organizational barriers
common in most of the developing countries [54],
through the increase of indirect costs - time and travel -
and of delay in care due to the use of managed care
mechanisms; as well as to the creation of new obstacles
that do not appear in public models without competi-
tion, such as the denial of care in public facilities to
uninsured people.
Characteristics of healthcare services
It is noteworthy that the shortage of specialized services
and limited geographic accessibility emerge as barriers
in the urban area, and for the insurance regime with lar-
ger resources (contributory). This seems to indicate that
a greater benefit package does not translate into better
access in economically disadvantaged areas. In fact, the
Quality of Life Surveys show that the geographic barrier
is an increasingly important reason not to seek health-
care services in the contributory regime [26]. These
results reflect the difficult role of the health regulatory
authority in guaranteeing that insurance companies offer
networks with needed and geographically accessible ser-
vices; and, consequently, how inappropriate it is for
public authorities to devolve to the market planning
decisions regarding investment in services. That there is
an economic barrier also in the contributory regime is
surprising, although data from the Quality of Life Sur-
veys (Encuesta de Calidad y Vida - ECV) already showed
that 10.6% of members of the contributory regime do
not use services due to lack of money [26]. This barrier
seems to be related more to the time and transportation
cost because of geographic and organizational (authori-
zation requirements) inaccessibility, than to co-payment.
Limitations of the study
In the rural area, managers and administrative personnel
of the EPS’S refused to participate and it was not possi-
ble to find a replacement case as it was the only insur-
ance company operating in the area. The missing of
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Page 9 of 12these actors’ opinions might mean that the information
is not complete [71]. In the urban area, the only EPS of
the contributory regime that agreed to participate was a
non-profit insurance company, whose health services
network was near to the area of study. These character-
istics should be taken into account in the interpretation
and transferral of results to other contexts [72]. With
commercial EPS’S, it is reasonable to assume that obsta-
cles would be greater.
Conclusions
The origin of all of the problems of healthcare access in
the Colombia public healthcare system can not be
attributed to the managed competition model, but the
results show how it has contributed to widen structural
and organizational barriers of access to care, as well as
to the creation of new ones that do not appear in public
models without competition. Therefore, the results
question the introduction of this type of model in low-
and middle-income countries, as they show how extra-
ordinarily difficult it is for a regulation scheme to effec-
tively correct market failures, despite 16 years of
regulatory effort. In these circumstances, the insurance
companies and healthcare providers ultimately deter-
mine the conditions for the population’s access to
healthcare, and therefore, the level of equity of access in
the healthcare system.
Moreover, this research has made possible the in-
depth analysis of the factors influencing access to
healthcare services that have rarely been considered in
research in Colombia. It has also allowed some of the
results obtained in other studies to be interpreted, such
as the presence of economic and geographical barriers
in the contributory regime [26]. This indicates the need
for future surveys to distinguish between insurers’ bar-
riers and healthcare service barriers.
Both the health authority’s inability to guarantee the
provision of adequate care in rural and poor urban
areas, and the persistence of barriers to health care, sug-
gest the need for an integral reform rather than the par-
tial measures (based on the assumption that improved
regulation would ensure access) already adopted. A
unique public system should be put into place, with
integration of funding and health insurance, that is
more equitable and easier to manage and regulate
[73,74].
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